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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite approach to conflict emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This contrast encapsulates the central tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on commerce and ending wars—despite the fact that this squares with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, noting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This change is significant, but observers note it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Neglect and Friction

In contrast to his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Targeted Involvement

An analogous standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.